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Freedom of Association, Extreme Partisan
Gerrymandering, Justiciability and the Unmistakable
Political Question Controversy
L. Darnell Weeden
fK==fåíêçÇìÅíáçå=
The issue to be addressed is whether partisan gerrymandering is a
political question not capable of judicial resolution by federal courts,
or whether partisan gerrymandering is instead a politicized issue that
justices on the Court intentionally do not want to address at this time
because they want to remain politicized while not appearing to be a
politicized Supreme Court. The Court on June 27, 2019, in a 5-4 decision, held that partisan gerrymandering allegations are political issues that federal courts should not consider.1 By now, it should be common knowledge that all of the justices who voted to accept the view
that partisan gerrymandering is a political question were appointed by
a Republican president, while all of the justices who voted to hear the
partisan gerrymandering issue on the merits were appointed by a president who identified as a Democrat.
I reject the Court’s analysis and conclusion that partisan gerrymandering is a political question, and argue that the Court is obligated to
resolve partisan First Amendment gerrymandering issues to redress
the injuries suffered by plaintiffs. The Supreme Court should address
partisan gerrymandering issues on the merits. The effort by a group of
California Democrats in proposing legislation requiring congressional
districts to be redrawn by independent redistricting commissions on
* Associate Dean of Faculty Development & Research Professor of Law Roberson King
Professor, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University; B.A., J.D., University
of Mississippi. I am thankful to my wife and my children for their tolerance while I produced this
article. I would like to recognize my research assistant, Bernardo Villarreal Aguirre, Juris Doctorate candidate 2020, for his valuable research help. I would also like to thank the members of
BYU Journal of Public Law for their very helpful suggestions during the publishing of my article.
1. Jacqueline Thomsen, California Democrats Unveil Redistricting Reform Bill After
Supreme Court Partisan Gerrymandering Ruling, THE HILL (June 28, 2019 1:03 PM),
https://thehill.com/homenews/house/450903-california-democrats-unveil-redistricting-reformbill-after-supreme-court.
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June 28, 2019, the day after the Supreme Court held that courts lack
the ability to judge partisan gerrymandering allegations,2 is a step in
the right direction because of the belief that the commissions will take
every reasonable effort to avoid partisan gerrymandering. The proposed federal legislation requires each state to create independent
commissions and it gives the duty of creating legislative boundaries for
congressional districting to those commissions.3 House Rules Committee Chairwoman Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.) said, “If the U.S. Supreme
Court won't fight to protect Americans' votes, then Congress will.”4
Lofgren also declared, “Our democracy cannot function properly unless every person's vote counts equally, and voters choose their elected
officials, not the other way around. My bill would fix our broken redistricting process to ensure all voices are heard and politicians are held
accountable.”5 Under the proposed federal law the commissions and
not the state legislature create the boundaries for each congressional
district.6 The proposed independent commission legislation is not new
because virtually identical legislation was approved by the House in
2019.7
The legislative fate of the federal independent commission proposal is currently very problematic. “However, Senate Majority Leader
Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) has said that he won't bring it up for a vote
on the Senate floor.”8 Perhaps the Republican Senator McConnell
does not want to take steps to do away with partisan gerrymandering
because of a demonstrated partisan advantage for Republicans.9 “In the
drawing of lines for hundreds of U.S. and state legislative seats . . . according to an Associated Press (AP) analysis: Republicans had a real
advantage.”10 The AP study included 435 U.S. races as well as approximately 4,700 state legislative seats during the 2016 election cycle to

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Associated Press, Analysis: Partisan Gerrymandering Has Benefited Republicans
More than Democrats, BUS. INSIDER (June 25, 2017, 12:25 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/partisan-gerrymandering-has-benefited-republicans-more-than-democrats2017-6.
10. Id.
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determine whether partisan gerrymandering typically delivered more
benefits to Republicans or Democrats.11 The study identified the Republican Party as the party that benefited most from partisan gerrymandering.12 “The analysis found four times as many states with Republican-skewed state House or Assembly districts than Democratic
ones. Among the two dozen most populated states that determine the
vast majority of Congress, there were nearly three times as many with
Republican-tilted U.S. House districts.”13 In the highly contested political frontlines of Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Florida, and Virginia, the Republicans maintain a partisan gerrymandering redistricting benefit. All of those long-established
battleground states had their congressional legislative districts designed by Republicans after the last census in 2010.14 In addition, the
AP analysis determined “that Republicans won as many as 22 additional U.S. House seats over what would have been expected based on
the average vote share in congressional districts across the country.
That helped provide the GOP with a comfortable majority over Democrats instead of a narrow one.”15 The AP study is consistent with a
study conducted by the Brennan Center for Justice at the New York
University School of Law during the 2012-2016 congressional election
cycles.16 The Brennan Center also found Republicans benefited more
from partisan gerrymandering than Democrats and concluded there
was “clear evidence that aggressive gerrymandering is distorting the
nation's congressional maps,” presenting a “threat to democracy.”17

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.; see also Michael Li, Extreme Maps, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE
(May 9, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/extreme-maps (“Using data from the 2012, 2014, and 2016 election cycles, Extreme Maps finds that partisan bias
resulting largely from the worst gerrymandering abuses in just a few battleground states provides
Republicans a durable advantage of 16-17 seats in the current Congress, representing a significant
portion of the 24 seats Democrats would need to gain control of the House in 2020. These ‘extreme maps’ were all drawn in states under single-party control; the report finds that conversely,
maps drawn by independent commissions, courts, or split-party state governments had significantly less partisan bias in their maps.”).
17. Id.; see also Associated Press, Partisan gerrymandering benefited Republicans in 2016
election – report, THE GUARDIAN (June 25, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/jun/ 25/partisan-gerrymandering-republicans-2016-report (“A separate statistical
analysis conducted for the AP by the Princeton University Gerrymandering Project found that the
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Since political context matters, the issue of partisan gerrymandering cries out for federal judicial relief from the Court. The partisan
gerrymandering issue will perhaps reappear before the Court as soon
as Republicans believe that extreme partisan gerrymander produces a
concrete injury to Republicans rather than an advantage. In the near
future, an inconsistent conservative majority on a politicized Supreme
Court could reach the right conclusion for the wrong reason by deciding that partisan gerrymandering is no longer a political question incapable of judicial resolution when the evidence demonstrates a persistent pattern of an advantage for Democrats utilizing partisan
gerrymanders. Judicial prudence demands that a truly impartial and
independent Court will follow the examples of lower courts and commentators and hear the merits of partisan gerrymandering claims. As
soon as the Court is ready to do so, it may address those constitutional
allegations on the merits and reverse the position that partisan gerrymandering presents a political question. This article implies that the
Supreme Court’s holding that partisan gerrymandering is a political
question creates a plausible argument that a majority of the justices
may have become politicized on the partisan gerrymandering issue.
Part I briefly discusses the partisan burdens placed on the freedom
of association prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Rucho v. Common Cause.18 Part II presents a historical judicial treatment of partisan
gerrymandering. Part III contends a statewide right of political association injury in a “district-specific, extreme partisan” gerrymandering
case is justiciable because judicially discernable and manageable standards exist to redress the plaintiff's allegation that she has suffered a
concrete harm because of the associational burdens created by partisan
gerrymandering. Part III also reminds us that it is important to
acknowledge that the lower federal courts’ judgments discovering
standing in partisan gerrymandering cases establish that these partisan

extreme Republican advantages in some states were no fluke. The Republican edge in Michigan’s
state House districts had only a 1-in-16,000 probability of occurring by chance; in Wisconsin’s Assembly districts, there was a mere 1-in-60,000 likelihood of it happening randomly, the analysis found.
The AP’s findings are similar to recent ones from the Brennan Center for Justice at the New York
University School of Law, which used three statistical tests to analyze the 2012-2016 congressional
elections. Its report found a persistent Republican advantage and ‘clear evidence that aggressive gerrymandering is distorting the nation’s congressional maps’, posing a ‘threat to democracy’. The Brennan Center did not analyze state legislative elections. The AP’s analysis was based on a formula developed by University of Chicago law professor Nick Stephanopoulos and Eric McGhee, a researcher
at the nonpartisan Public Policy Institute of California.”).
18. See generally Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
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gerrymandering cases should not be considered political question issues because the lower federal courts are quite capable of resolving
partisan gerrymander issues under a First Amendment freedom of association analysis. In Part IV, an analysis of the extreme partisan gerrymandering issue in Gill v. Whitford indicates that it is unnecessary
to treat partisan gerrymandering as a political question. In Part V, the
post-Gill v. Whitford lower court partisan gerrymandering cases
demonstrate how to judicially apply discernable and manageable
standards to redress a partisan gerrymandering issue without violating
the political question doctrine. In Part VI, the article proclaims the
Supreme Court’s conclusion in Rucho v. Common Cause, that partisan gerrymandering allegations are nonjusticiable political questions
not capable of federal judicial resolution, is so flawed the Supreme
Court should reconsider this question as soon as possible. Part VI supports the view asserted by Justice Kagan in her powerful dissent in
Rucho19 that for the first time in its history, the Supreme Court has
declined to provide relief for a constitutional infringement because it
considers the duty outside the scope of judicial expertise. Part VI argues that the refusal to grant judicial relief from partisan gerrymandering creates the plausible appearance that some of the justices may
be too politicized to exercise their judicial expertise to provide relief
for a constitutional violation alleging partisan gerrymandering because
partisan gerrymandering currently benefits the Republican Party. The
conclusion in Part VII rejects the Supreme Court’s Court big-picture
claim that partisan gerrymandering should be treated as a political
question because partisan gerrymandering cannot be politically neutral
or manageable.20 The Supreme Court's political question rationale
should be rejected because the lower courts, with a rationale that is
superior to the Supreme Court’s rationale in logic if not in law, have
developed standards that allow for neutral and manageable oversight
of partisan gerrymandering.21

19.
20.
21.

Id. at 2516 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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The Supreme Court’s June 27, 2019, rather surprising refusal to
render a decision on the merits in a partisan gerrymandering case in
Rucho v. Common Cause based on the belief that partisan gerrymandering presents a political question the Supreme Court cannot resolve,
is misguided.22 States have used the gerrymandering process to adopt
extremely partisan redistricting plans.23 Minority party voters may be
“cracked” by the process of dividing a party's followers into multiple
legislative districts so that they fail to reach an electoral majority in an
election in any of the districts.24 Sometimes minority party voters are
also described as being “packed” in a gerrymandering process which
overpopulates the minority party’s voters inside a small number of districts where the minority party candidates are likely to win with large
majorities. Packing typically has the practical effect of assuring that a
minority party candidate's significant voting majority fails to significantly increase legislative seats for representatives of the minority
party.25 Packing undermines representative democracy because notwithstanding minority party candidates receiving significantly larger
statewide voter support than the majority party, the number of minority party representatives to actually serve in the legislature fails to reasonably correlate with the collective associational ballots cast to support the views of minority party candidates statewide.26

22.
23.

See generally Rucho, 139 S. Ct. 2484.
See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and
the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 831, 834, 849-50 (2015).
24. Id.
25. See Michael Li, Thomas Wolf & Annie Lo, The State of Redistricting Litigation
(October 14, 2019), BRENNAN CENTER (Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/state-redistricting-litigation (last visited July 15, 2019).
26. See Stephanopoulos, supra note 23, at 836-837 ("In the current cycle, for example,
the Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia congressional plans have gaps of at least two seats
that are unlikely to dissipate given plausible changes in voters' preferences. Likewise, the Idaho,
Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming state house plans have gaps of at least 8 percent that
also are unlikely to fade away in future elections."); see also Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d
837, 854 (W.D. Wis. 2016) vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
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Opponents of extreme partisan gerrymandering have attacked the
issue of the excessive partisan gerrymandering process with an efficiency gap theory because the efficiency gap shows how the associational value of a vote is wasted.27 Proponents of the efficiency gap theory contend that regardless of whether a minority party voter actually
lives in a district that was packed or cracked, the minority party has
been injured statewide as a result of the political exploitation of district
boundaries because minority party voters’ statewide expressive freedom of association is infringed upon.28 A voter suffers a concrete
statewide injury when the minority party’s larger expressive associational voting voice is granted lesser actual representative power in the
state legislature, while the majority party who won a lesser amount of
the cast ballots statewide is rewarded with greater representative
power. The majority party’s greater legislative representation visits a
statewide injury on the minority party voters because their collective
voting majority is not reflected in the partisan makeup of the state legislature. Excessive partisan redistricting distorts the collective associational representational rights of the legislatively underrepresented minority party.29 The potential power of packing and cracking “can be
measured by a single calculation: an ‘efficiency gap’ that compares each
party’s respective ‘wasted’ votes across all legislative districts. ‘Wasted’
votes are those cast for a losing candidate or for a winning candidate
in excess of what that candidate needs to win.”30 Under an expanded
version of the efficiency gap theory, when partisan voting statewide
produces a large majority voting preference for the minority party and
the minority party remains the minority party, an associational injury
occurs.31 An association injury exists because the partisan majority
votes cast are wasted, producing a collective statewide injury given that
the state legislature is very likely to produce partisan laws that apply
statewide and are not restricted to a specific legislative district.32
The author believes scholars, legal analysts, and litigators, unlike
the Supreme Court, actually accepted Justice Kagan’s challenge in her
concurring opinion in Gill v. Whitford.33 Justice Kagan challenged the

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1924 (2018).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1924-26.
Id. at 1924.
Id. at 1934.
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plaintiffs on remand to offer the court more than a vote dilution theory
for an individual voter in a partisan redistricting gerrymandering case
and to also develop the freedom of association right to support a
statewide collective injury under the First Amendment. According to
Justice Kagan, partisan gerrymandering not only unmistakably burdens individual voters, but also causes harm of a different type by infringing on voters’ First Amendment right to the freedom association.34
There are good reasons supporting the development of the right
to the freedom of association in an excessively partisan gerrymandering litigation. Under a First Amendment Freedom of Association analysis, plaintiffs presenting the challenge in excessive partisan gerrymandering cases should not be required to prove that their particular
voting district was packed or cracked in support of their statewide injury-in-fact standing claim.35 The packing or cracking of a district has
no appropriate link to their substantive associational injury-in-fact
claim to a collective entitlement to a representative number of seats in
the legislature based on the number of partisan votes cast by the voters
statewide.36 Without any hesitation, Justice Kagan correctly asserts
that the Court should consider everything about the right to freedom
of association in a partisan gerrymandering challenge from standing
on down to remedy.37 It is my contention that if extreme partisan redistricting plan cause voters in the state to lose seats in the legislature,
those voters have suffered enough state wide partisan harm to support
Article III standing.38
The freedom of association was first officially recognized in
NAACP v. Alabama, a 1958 case, as a fundamental right subject to
strict scrutiny, which means the government must demonstrate that an
efficiency gap cracking or packing regulation is required to serve a
compelling justification and must be accomplished by least restrictive
means.39 The Court reasoned that freedom of association is an inseparable aspect of the liberty assured by the Due Process Clause of the
34. Id. at 1934, 1938-39.
35. Id. at 1938-39.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1938-40.
38. Contra id. at 1916, 1931.
39. See Charles E. Rice, The Constitutional Right of Association, 16 HASTINGS L.J. 491,
491-492 (1965) ("It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement
of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of
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Fourteenth Amendment.40 After NAACP v. Alabama, the Supreme
Court's decisions referred to constitutionally-protected ‘freedom of
association’ in two distinct senses: as embracing (1) the choice “to enter
into and maintain certain intimate human relationships”41 as safeguarding one’s personal liberty, and (2) “a right to associate for the
purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the
exercise of religion.”42 The Supreme Court said the right of association
included “political assemblies . . . , social and legal, and economic benefit’ of citizens.”43 Recognizing a fundamental right in the freedom of
association pertaining to political, social, legal, and economic matters,
the Supreme Court further developed the idea of a fundamental right
of association in relation to voting by holding that “the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the
right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast
their votes effectively”44 may not be unduly burdened. The Supreme
Court in California Democratic Party v. Jones emphasized the need
for a compelling government interest by least restrictive means to protect a political party’s right of expressive association under the First
Amendment, and the Court asserted representative democracy “is unimaginable without the ability of citizens to band together in promoting among the electorate candidates who espouse their political
views.”45

the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.") (quoting NAACP v. Ala. ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)); see also Patterson, at 460–61 ("Of course, it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic,
religious or cultural matters, and state action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom
to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.").
40. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460-61.
41. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23-24 (1989).
42. Id.
43. Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 26 ("that '[t]he right to freely associate is not limited to “political”
assemblies, but includes those that “pertain to the social, legal, and economic benefit” of our
citizens.'" (quoting Stanglin v. City of Dallas, 744 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Tex. App. 1987), writ denied (Mar. 2, 1988), rev'd, 490 U.S. 19 (1989)); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan & Noah Feldman,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1413 (19th ed. 2016).
44. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968).
45. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574 (2000).
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Before 1962, legislative districting controversies were considered
to be non-justiciable political questions because plaintiffs had to state
a case or controversy that satisfied the criteria for making an appropriate judicial determination.46 In 1973, the Supreme Court first considered the issue of partisan gerrymandering in Gaffney v. Cummings.47
In Gaffney, Justice White concluded in the majority opinion that the
presence of political purposes in congressional redistricting is constitutionally permissible.48 The Gaffney Court concluded that since taking politics out of the redistricting process was an unmanageable job
for judges, the Supreme Court should not even try to limit the undemocratic impact to politics on legislative redistricting.49 The implication
of Gaffney was a lack of judicially manageable standards to regulate the
limit on the anti-democratic impact of extreme politics in redistricting.50 The Gaffney Court suggested that partisan gerrymandering
could possibly be unconstitutional, but failed to instruct how to apply
manageable judicial standards to determine whether partisan gerrymandering violates the constitution.51
In 1986, the Supreme Court reviewed Davis v. Bandemer and addressed the constitutionality of political gerrymandering (used loosely
to describe the common practice of the party in power choosing the
redistricting plan that gives it an advantage at the polls), and held that
a “threshold showing of discriminatory vote dilution is required for a

46. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) ("Prominent on the surface of any case
held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question."); see also Sullivan & Feldman, supra note 43 at 814.
47. Richard E. Finneran & Steven K. Luther, Filling the Gap in the Efficiency Gap:
Measuring Partisan Gerrymandering on a Per-District Basis, 46 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
385, 392 (2019) (citing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973)).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (relying on Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 754).
51. Id.
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prima facie case of an equal protection violation,”52which is satisfied by
showing intentional discrimination against an identifiable political
group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group.53 Despite this
language, partisan gerrymandering claims have been rather unsuccessful in seeking constitutional protection under the Equal Protection
Clause.54 Chief Justice Roberts correctly perceived in Whitford that
the Supreme Court’s prior attempts to resolve partisan gerrymandering claims simply failed to provide clear and adequate judicial standards on how to resolve partisan gerrymandering allegations.55 The
1986 partisan gerrymandering case of Davis v. Bandemer serves so far
as the only case where the Court has held that allegations of partisan
gerrymandering are hypothetically justiciable, stating that a potential
Equal Protection Clause violation may exist where the electoral
scheme extensively burdens an actual voter’s chance to realistically impact partisan political practices.56 Bandemer recognizes partisan gerrymandering cases as hypothetically justiciable, and that an Equal Protection Clause violation could possibly exist in a case where the
electoral scheme extensively burdens an actual voter’s chance to realistically impact partisan political practice.57 Although the Court in
Bandemer agreed that partisan gerrymandering claims were theoretically justiciable under the equal protection clause, it rejected the District Court’s legal and factual bases for concluding that the Indiana reapportionment plan burden enough constitutionally protected rights
to constitute a breach of the Equal Protection Clause on the merits of
the case.58
In Vieth v. Jubelirer,59 a gerrymandering case, Pennsylvania Democrats challenged a redistricting plan they believed gave excessively
promising partisan prospects to Republicans by sacrificing established
redistricting principles.60 Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment
(on affirming the circuit court and overturning Bandemer), but he
52. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986).
53. See also Sullivan & Feldman, supra note 43 at 821.
54. Finneran, supra note 47 at 392.
55. Id. (citing Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1926 (2018)).
56. Id. at 393 (citing Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986)).
57. Id. (citing Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 133 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Justice O'Connor
was joined by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Justice William Rehnquist)).
58. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 129-30 (1986).
59. Finneran, supra note 47 at 394 (citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004)).
60. Id. (citing Vieth, 541 U.S. at 272).
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made it clear that he had hope for future “workable standards” that
would “emerge to measure these burdens,” and that “courts should be
prepared to order relief.”61 It is worth noting that “Justice Kennedy's
opinion concurring in the judgment preserved Bandemer, even though
he agreed with the plurality that no workable standard had yet been
advanced to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims.”62 Subsequent
partisan gerrymandering cases (including Rucho) made it clear that the
Supreme Court has rejected the effects test in Bandemer as unacceptable because of the lack of discernable judicial standards to resolve the
issue.
The Court’s last partisan equal protection clause gerrymandering
pronouncement before Whitford came in League of United Latin
American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry.63 In LULAC, the Court addressed whether a judicially manageable standard had been established
in partisan gerrymandering cases under an equal protection analysis.
The Court in LULAC decided that a partisan gerrymandering injury
is required to be based on an injury to real voters.64 The pre-Whitford
cases demonstrate that the Court has avoided granting relief on the
merits in partisan gerrymandering cases under an equal protection
analysis.65

fffK==^ = p q^qbtfab= o fdeq=lc= m lifqf`^i= ^ ppl`f^qflk=
f kgrov=fk=^= “a fpqof`q Jp mb`fcf` I = b uqobjb= m ^oqfp^k Ò=
d boovj^kabofkd= ` ^pb=fp= g rpqf`f^_ib=_ b`^rpb=
g raf`f^iiv= a fp`bok^_ib=^ka= j ^k^db^_ib= p q^ka^oap=
b ufpq=ql= o baobpp=qeb= ^ iibd^qflk=qe^q=^= m i^fkqfcc=
p rccboba= ` lk`obqb= e ^oj= _ b`^rpb=lc=qeb=
^ ppl`f^qflk^i= _ roabkp= ` ob^qba=_v= m ^oqfp^k=
d boovj^kabofkd =
The expressive association freedoms claimed under the First
Amendment cry out for relief from the Court because the failure to
award legislative seats statewide reasonably proportionate to the ballots cast for any political party is a significant burden on expressive

61. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 317 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
62. Finneran, supra note 47 at 394
63. Id. at 395 (citing League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006)
[hereinafter LULAC]).
64. Id. (citing LULAC, 548 U.S. at 420).
65. Id. at 395-96.
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representational rights. I believe the Court could readily order an offending state legislature to correct the problem and subject the legislature to initial monitoring by the courts as needed. A showing of actual harm is easily demonstrated when a group of partisan voters
collectively and expressively casts ballots that entitle them to majority
representation in the legislature to advance their expressive political
agenda but the voters do not receive representation proportional to
their votes. I think the right to collective representation by voters is
severely burdened by significant underrepresentation of legislative
seats. The actual harm suffered by an actual group of voters, or an individual voter should be redressed by the Court.66 The fact that lower
federal courts have granted standing in partisan gerrymandering cases
supports the argument that partisan cases are not correctly treated as
political question issues because these cases reveal that federal courts
are quite capable of resolving partisan gerrymander issues under a First
Amendment freedom of association analysis. Partisan gerrymandering
causes real proportional representation harm to real voters who do not
receive representation statewide proportional to their statewide vote;
it is not is a political question because non-politicized lower federal
courts use manageable discernable judicial standards to grant relief
from unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering issues caused by a state
legislature’s collective proportional representation harm of plaintiffs.
In 2018, in Gill v. Whitford, the Supreme Court held that because
the plaintiffs challenging partisan gerrymandering suffered a districtspecific gerrymandering injury, the plaintiffs on remand must also
show a statewide injury-in-fact in order to meet the standing requirement under the Supreme Court’s unsettled and unresolved gerrymandering justiciability jurisprudence.67 In 2019, Gill v. Whitford was remanded to the trial court where the plaintiffs raised justiciability,
standing, First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment political gerrymandering issues.68 The trial court allowed discovery to proceed as
scheduled over a motion to stay, but the court said it would delay the
trial and any decision on the merits until after the Supreme Court had

66.
67.
68.
2019).

See id. at 396.
See generally Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
See Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-CV-421-JDP, 2019 WL 294800 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 23,
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decided Common Cause v. Rucho69 and Benisek v. Lamone,70 as those
decisions could produce game-changing implications for the issues
raised by Whitford.71 The Court’s decision in Common Cause v.
Rucho unfortunately denied a federal judicial remedy because of the
political question doctrine.72 Because I predict that the Court’s holding
and rationale in Common Cause v. Rucho73 will have a relatively short
shelf-life, it is worthwhile to review those cases which implicitly or directly did not determine partisan gerrymandering to be a political
question.74
Gill v. Whitford held that plaintiff voters lacked standing because they had not demonstrated a particularized injury because the
injury was district-specific and not statewide. The plaintiffs alleged the
state’s redistricting plan because of partisan gerrymandering negatively impacted the composition of the state legislature because partisan gerrymandering “unreasonably burdens their First Amendment
rights of association.”75 The right of political association safeguards a
collective concern in the honest operation of the electoral process.76
Extreme partisan gerrymandering infringes on the right of association
by severely impeding one’s fair and reasonable representation in the
electoral process without a compelling government interest.77 The
right of political association without burdensome representative dilution statewide is similar to the First Amendment’s prohibition on con-

69. 318 F. Supp. 3d 777 (M.D.N.C. 2018).
70. 348 F. Supp. 3d 493 (D. Md. 2018).
71. See Whitford, 2019 WL 294800; see also Benisek, 348 F. Supp. 3d at 493; Common
Cause, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 777.
72. See generally Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S.Ct. at 2484 (2019).
73. Id.
74. See Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Smith, 335 F. Supp. 3d 988, 996-97 (S.D. Ohio
2018).
75. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 854, 55 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated and
remanded, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
76. See Brief of Amici Curiae Election Law and Constitutional Law Scholars in Support
of Appellees at 7-8, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No.16-1161), 2017 WL 3948425
("This Court's patronage cases similarly recognize that the right of association protects both the
individual interest in associating with like-minded others and the collective interest in 'the free
functioning of the electoral process.' . . . Elrod and its progeny also illustrate the centrality of
political parties to the right of association—and the corresponding harms arising from the dominant party's discrimination against a non-dominant party to entrench itself in power.").
77. Id. at 19.
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tent and viewpoint discrimination as violations of the freedom of expression.78 When citizens vote for a political party in furtherance of
political goals with like-minded individuals, the government may not
undermine collective associational political expression in the absence
of a compelling government interest.79 Supporters of these extreme
partisan gerrymandering plans leave the collective associational rights
of minority party voters behind with the flawed argument that in the
absence of a significant discriminatory effect on a minority political
party with a majority of the popular vote, the minority political party
has not suffered a harm in not having partisan seats reasonably correlated with that of the popular vote. An intentional redistricting plan
that yields districts designed to give one party an unreasonable and unfair electoral advantage over another creates a chilling effect on the
political association rights statewide in violation of the First Amendment’s strict scrutiny requirements.80 Evidence reveals that the purpose of partisan gerrymandering plans is to severely impair the effectiveness of the collective political speech of a collection of citizens on
the basis of their political affiliation.81
After Gill v. Whitford, recent decisions in several federal district
courts have granted standing to challengers of the extreme partisan
gerrymandering practice of “cracking” and “packing” under the theory
that the challengers may have suffered a statewide political injury as a
result of an unconstitutional infringement on their collective right of
expressive association.82 In my view, it is significant to note that the
78. See id. at 5 ("Freedom of association is closely linked to the First Amendment's prohibition on content and viewpoint discrimination. This Court has held that, '[a]bove all else, the
First Amendment 'means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.' This principle applies with special force where
political speech is concerned, to ensure that the dominant political group may not stifle or diminish the collective voice of its opponents." (quoting Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 95 (1972)).
79. Id. at 19.
80. Contra id. at 16 ("In the context of redistricting, then, there must be a significant
discriminatory effect on a political party and its adherents for the restriction to be deemed 'severe.' The mere fact that a redistricting plan yields districts that tend to result in one party's
having an electoral advantage over another does not alone demonstrate discrimination or compel
strict scrutiny." (Cf. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992))).
81. See Steven Semeraro, Partisan Gerrymandering: Is There No Shame in It or Have
Politicians Become Shameless?, 48 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1, 40 (2017) ("[I]nstead of choosing to respect statewide vote totals, the majority party in the legislature used statistical predictions to
choose a map that would produce radically disproportional results. Choosing that map revealed
the drafters' requisite intent to discriminate . . .").
82. See generally Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019); Benisek v. Lamone,
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lower court’s grant of standing in partisan gerrymandering cases
demonstrates that these cases are not properly treated as political question issues because the federal courts are quite capable of resolving
partisan gerrymander issues under a First Amendment freedom of association analysis. Although this article focuses on the implications of
extreme partisan gerrymandering on the right to the freedom of political association and expression, recent polls suggest that the public may
have come to believe that highly partisan judicial appointments have
unreasonably influenced the Supreme Court's interest in establishing
clear rules to eliminate the negative impact of partisan gerrymandering
by deciding that redistricting with intentional partisan bias is not prohibited.83 In Rucho v. Common Cause,84 the Court clearly refused to
judicially remove the negative impact of partisan gerrymandering on
the electoral process by declaring that partisan gerrymandering claims
are political questions outside the reach of federal courts.

348 F. Supp. 3d 493 (D. Md. 2018); Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777 (M.D. N.C.
2018); Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Smith, 335 F. Supp. 3d 988 (S.D. Ohio 2018), appeal
docketed, No. 19-70 (U.S. July 12, 2019).
83. See New Bipartisan Poll Shows Support for Supreme Court to Establish Clear Rules
for Gerrymandering¸ CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER (Jan. 28, 2019), https://campaignlegal.org/update/new-bipartisan-poll-shows-support-supreme-court-establish-clear-rules-gerrymandering
("Nearly three-quarters of voters support the U.S. Supreme Court establishing clear rules for
when gerrymandering violates the Constitution, with broad support extending across partisan
and racial lines . . . [a]t least 60 percent of Democrats, Independents and Republicans support the
creation of independent redistricting commissions."); see also Jenny Jarvie, Why Texas Is Texas:
A Gerrymandering Case Cuts to the Core of the State's Transformation, L.A. TIMES (Jul. 11,
2017, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-texas-gerrymander-20170711-story.html
("Voting rights advocates have long accused Texas Republicans of working to undermine the
growing political clout of Latino and African American voters by intentionally—and unfairly—
cramming them into districts or splitting them up so they are outnumbered. Republican legislators still control roughly two-thirds of State House and Senate and congressional seats."); Olga
Pierce & Kate Rabinowitz, 'Partisan' Gerrymandering Is Still About Race, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 9,
2017, 6:48 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/partisan-gerrymandering-is-still-about-race
("This is, in fact, a dilution of Democratic voting power. But it also places thousands of AfricanAmerican and Latino citizens in a heavily white district where they have little hope of electing a
candidate who will represent their interests.").
84. 139 S. Ct. 2484.
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Gerrymandering issues are justiciable only if there is a showing of
discriminatory intent and effect.85 The Supreme Court of the United
States has held that a showing of simply a political advantage is not
enough to demonstrate discriminatory intent and effect as to show a
cognizable injury.86 The alleged harm of a dilution of votes is limited
to the district in which a plaintiff lives because the plaintiff has not
suffered a statewide injury.87 However, the First Amendment implicates an “associational” injury from partisan gerrymandering because
partisan gerrymandering burdens “the ability of like-minded people
across the State to affiliate in a political party and carry out that organization’s activities and object[ives]. . . This ‘associational harm of a partisan gerrymander is distinct from vote dilution.’”88 While rejecting
“district-specific vote-dilution claims under the First Amendment,
partisan plaintiffs ‘could make use of statewide evidence and seek a
statewide remedy.’”89 Redressing the alleged statewide harm requires
a state legislature to revise only such districts as are necessary to reshape the voter’s district so that the voter may be unpacked or
uncracked.90 “[S]ome members of the Supreme Court have expressed
the view that judicial enforcement of the principle that each voter has
a right to have his vote treated equally must be limited to situations
where the dilution is based on classifications such as race and population. These reservations have been grounded in the concern that distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate political motivations is
not a task to be undertaken by judges.”91 Justice Kennedy’s and Justice
Steven’s opinions in Vieth v. Jubelirer92 articulate their belief that in
partisan gerrymandering cases the First Amendment may prohibit the

85. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 660 (1993) (White, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 659 (White, J., dissenting)
87. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1930-31 (2018).
88. See Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Householder, 367 F. Supp. 3d 697, 712 (S.D.
Ohio, 2019) (quoting Gill, 137 S. Ct. at 1938).
89. Id. (quoting Gill, 137 S. Ct. at 1934).
90. See Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1921.
91. See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 883 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).).
92. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
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state from placing burdens on voters on the basis of their allies or their
viewpoints.93
The Supreme Court has expressed an emphasis on ensuring that
an individual’s vote receive the same weight as every other person’s
vote, which necessarily implicates that individual’s associational
rights.94 The Court previously has observed the link between the right
to vote and the right to associate by describing a partisan unit whose
members share a particular viewpoint, associational preference, or economic status.95 Analogous to ballot-access cases where independent
party members were unduly burdened by State regulations that infringed on those party members’ right of association, minority party
members such as those in Gill v. Whitford are significantly burdened
by extreme partisan gerrymandering and lack of fair representation.96
“A burden that falls unequally on new or small political parties or on
independent candidates impinges, by its very nature, on associational
choices protected by the First Amendment. It discriminates against
those candidates and voters whose political preferences lie outside the
existing political parties.”97 In Whitford it was said, “[W]hen the state
places an artificial burden on the ability of voters of a certain political
persuasion to form a legislative majority, it necessarily diminishes the
weight of the vote of each of those voters when compared to the votes
of individuals favoring another view. The burdened voter simply has a
diminished or even no opportunity to effect a legislative majority. That
voter is, in essence, an unequal participant in the decisions of the body

93. See id. at 270, 294 (Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion: "While the equal protection standard continues to govern such cases, the First Amendment may prove to offer a sounder
and more prudential basis for judicial intervention in political gerrymandering cases. First
Amendment analysis does not dwell on whether a generally permissible classification has been
used for an impermissible purpose, but concentrates on whether the legislation burdens the representational rights of the complaining party's voters for reasons of ideology, beliefs, or political
association"; Justice Steven's dissenting opinion: "To say that suppression of political speech (a
claimed First Amendment violation) triggers strict scrutiny is not to say that failure to give political groups equal representation (a claimed equal protection violation) triggers strict scrutiny.
Only an equal protection claim is before us in the present case—perhaps for the very good reason
that a First Amendment claim, if it were sustained, would render unlawful all consideration of
political affiliation in districting, just as it renders unlawful all consideration of political affiliation
in hiring for non-policy-level government jobs").
94. See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 881.
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793–94 (1983).
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politic.”98 Justice Stevens expressed that the freedom of association in
political belief and affiliation constituted the core of those activities
that are protected by the First Amendment, and any infringement by
the government to burden those interests is subject to strict scrutiny.99
According to Professor Steven Semeraro, data show that as a result of
modern sophisticated redistricting software, when designing districts,
controlling political parties are able with pinpoint precision to significantly distort the true representation of minority party voters in their
political party as a whole within a state, essentially shutting the minority party out of the political process while ignoring traditional districting requirements such as compactness, contiguity, and the like.100
According to the complaint in Gill v. Whitford, the Wisconsin redistricting plan known as Act 43 was drafted to purposely distribute
the predicted Republican vote share with greater efficiency so that it
translated into a greater number of seats, while purposely distributing
the Democratic vote share with less efficiency so that it would translate
into fewer seats.101 The plaintiffs alleged the act was drafted and enacted with the specific discriminatory intent to maximize the electoral
advantage of Republicans and harm Democrats to the greatest possible
extent.102 Furthermore, according to the plaintiffs, the act resulted in a
specific discriminatory effect as demonstrated by data which shows a
substantial Republican efficiency gap advantage in 2012 as well as in
2014, although a very reliable “Demonstration Plan” reduced the efficiency gap to 2% in 2012, with an operation equal to Act 43 in all the
additional applicable metric.103 It is the contention of the plaintiffs that

98. See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 882–83.
99. Id. at 875. (citations omitted)
100. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 663 (1993) (White, J., dissenting) ("'[A]n equal protection violation may be found only where the electoral system substantially disadvantages certain
voters in their opportunity to influence the political process effectively.' . . . By this, I meant that
the group must exhibit 'strong indicia of lack of political power and the denial of fair representation,' so that it could be said that it has 'essentially been shut out of the political process.'"(quoting
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133, 140 (1986)); see also, Semeraro supra note 81 at 27 ("As
early as 2004 . . . redistricting software was so sophisticated and powerful that . . . [g]errymanderers could thus pick and choose among different maps until they found the one that produced
their desired partisan result while also according with some traditional districting principles and
thus triggering the least suspicion.").
101. See Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 855.
102. Id. at 855.
103. Id.
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the “Demonstration Plan” directly evidences the majority party’s intent to discriminate against the minority party members’ right of expressive political association without a compelling justification and
without considering least restrictive means, because the majority party
adopted ACT 43 because it knew that Act would waste a significant
number of votes cast for the Democrats. The injury-in-fact, when considered together with the underlying issue of a lack of representation
as a whole, is not a mere dilution of votes in regards to a political edge,
but an infringement of the minority party members’ right to association.104 Moreover, additional data demonstrates circumstantial evidence of intentional repression of ethnic and racial minorities’ power
in the political process.105 For example, in Wisconsin's 2012 election,
the majority party received 60.6% of the legislative seats, but the majority party won less than half of the popular vote. And in 2014, although the minority party won the same proportion of the vote as in
2012, its legislative seats were reduced to 36.4% of the available
seats.106 Thus, according to the plaintiffs’ complaint, this type of extreme political gerrymandering infringes on one’s ability to advance
the group’s shared viewpoints by translating that partisan association
into political power through the ballot,107 and demonstrates the majority party’s intent to discriminate against a rival group and its supporters

104. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 at 110 (Justice White's plurality opinion: "unconstitutional discrimination occurs only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that
will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influence on the political process as a
whole.").
105. See Joshua Butera, Partisan Gerrymandering and Qualifications Clause, 95 B.U. L.
REV. 303, 328 (2015) ("The strongest evidence would likely come from election results data
before and after redistricting. In addition, the election results data should show the significant
difficulty for a candidate to win when the district was drawn with the intent that candidates from
that party not be able to win. For example, in North Carolina in 2012, it should not be difficult
to prove that gerrymandering substantially harmed Democratic candidates when they won 51%
of the votes cast statewide but a minority of the state's seats.").
106. See Brief of Amici Curiae Election Law and Constitutional Law Scholars in Support
of Appellees, supra note 76 at 3 ("Here, there can be no doubt that Wisconsin's plan severely
burdens the associational rights of the minority party and its adherents. To cite just one example
of the abundant evidence of party-based discrimination in the record: Republicans received
roughly 48% of the statewide vote and garnered 60.6% of the state's Assembly seats in 2012; two
years later, when Democrats received the same percentage of the vote, they captured only 36.4%
of the seats, or 24 seats fewer out of a total of 99. There is no compelling justification for the
discriminatory burden that Wisconsin's plan imposes on the non-dominant party and its adherents.").
107. Id. at 11-12.
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with the purpose and effect of diminishing the minority party’s collective voice as a whole in the electoral process.108 The argument of the
plaintiffs against extreme partisan gerrymandering is good public policy because voters are more likely to come out vote for the party candidate of their choice if they believe both their individual ballot and
collective ballots invoking the right of association matter when it
comes to determining how many legislative seats their political party
will be entitled to. The creation of extreme partisan gerrymandering
plans that create an efficiency gap above 7% statewide will continue to
favor the entrenched party throughout the life of the plan under any
likely electoral scenario.109 In the absence of an “unprecedented political earthquake,” the partisan gerrymandering plan would keep the minority party at a disadvantage as a political party statewide while severally burdening the minority party’s associational rights over the life
of the plan.110 The sheer magnitude of the difference between those
less restrictive alternative plans that would create an efficiency gap of
2.2% for example, and those above 7%, illustrates clear intention that
the discriminatory burden on associational rights is not the necessary
byproduct of other governmental interests, but rather is the purpose
and primary consequence of extreme partisan gerrymandering plans.111

sK == qeb= m lpq J d fii=s K = t efqcloa = i ltbo= ` lroq= m ^oqfp^k=
d boovj^kabofkd= ` ^pbp= a bjlkpqo^qb= e lt= ` lroqp=
`^k= ^ aaobpp= m ^oqfp^k= d boovj^kabofkd=tfqe=
a fp`bok^_ib=^ka= j ^k^db^_ib= p q^ka^oap= t fqelrq=
s fli^qfkd=qeb=m lifqf`^i= n rbpqflk= a l`qofkb =
There are a number of post-Gill federal court decisions addressing
the First Amendment gerrymandering issue with very plausible claim
recognition theories. For example, about two months after the Supreme Court's decision in Gill, in Ohio A. Philip Randolph Institute
v. Smith, a federal district court in Ohio, while speaking about the
plaintiff’s First Amendment rights in the context of a gerrymandering
challenge, acknowledged that First Amendment issues may appear

108.
109.

Id. at 12.
Id. at 21-24. (citing Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 905 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated and remanded, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018)
110. Id. (quoting Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 905).
111. Id. at 24.
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when legislative apportionment has the purpose and effect of burdening a group of voters’ representational rights because of their perspectives on partisan politics.112
After the 2010 Census, the Republican-dominated Ohio General
Assembly authorized redrawing congressional districts.113 It was alleged that Republicans used the 2011 reapportionment map to intentionally advance their interest in controlling legislative districts.114 The
plaintiffs asserted that the Republicans’ goal was to consolidate Republican congressional supremacy.115
In a concurring opinion in Gill, Justice Kagan took the position
that in a partisan gerrymandering case alleging a violation of the First
Amendment it is very plausible for a plaintiff to satisfy the standing
test.116 Justice Kagan believes that for purpose of standing, an injuryin-fact in a partisan gerrymandering case takes place if the partisan
conduct unduly burdens the ability of voters of a targeted political
party all over the State to freely associate in order to promote a partisan
agenda.117 If the associational injury is statewide, then by necessary implication the relevant statewide standing requirement has been met.118
The plaintiffs contend they established an injury-in-fact under Justice
Kagan’s test because the 2011 map unduly burdens the partisan power
of Democrats to freely associate.119 The plaintiffs claim that the map
burdens the right of association of voters for supporting or identifying
with the views of Democrats.120 Additionally, the plaintiffs asserted
that because of a lack of either a legitimate state interest or a compelling state interest, Ohio’s partisan district boundaries failed because of
a lack of adequate justification.121 The court appropriately found that
the individual Ohio plaintiffs each alleged specific facts signifying a
“concrete and particularized” injury.122 The individual plaintiffs

112. Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Smith, 335 F. Supp. 3d 988, 996-97 (S.D. Ohio
2018), appeal docketed, No. 19-70 (U.S. July 12, 2019).
113. Id. at 993.
114. Id. at 997.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. (citing Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1939 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring)).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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claimed they suffered definite burdens on their freedom of association
because partisan gerrymandering undermined the Democrats’ proficiency in implementing plans, which qualifies as an injury under Justice Kagan’s analysis.123Justice Kagan’s injury-in-fact theory for partisan gerrymandering strongly suggests that harms caused by partisan
gerrymandering are justiciable because they are capable of judicial resolution and should not be categorically treated as political questions.124
The 2011 map burdens plaintiffs’ partisan activities by targeting
Democrats with unreasonable partisan attacks.125 Plaintiffs demonstrated injury-in-fact, under the Kagan rationale, because the 2011
map increased the challenge of appealing to voters during the course
of registration.126
All of the plaintiffs in Ohio A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Smith
have adequately pleaded an injury-in-fact under the standards expressed in Justice Kagan’s concurrence in Gill.127 Moreover, a threejudge district court panel in Maryland adopted a theory of the injuryin-fact separate from the proposal made by Justice Kagan.128 The Maryland panel discussed a partisan gerrymandering claim as being prohibited by the First Amendment.129 The Shapiro panel believed that to
present an injury-in-fact, “the plaintiff must show that the challenged
map diluted the votes of the targeted citizens to such a degree that it
resulted in a tangible and concrete adverse effect. In other words, the
vote dilution must make some practical difference.”130 A First Amendment claim of partisan gerrymandering is plausible if the intentional
manipulation of redistricting the data makes it more difficult for targeted partisan voters to freely associate in order to achieve electoral
success because of their past exercise of their right of freedom of partisan association.131 Under the standing requirement, the plaintiffs
have a duty to plead sufficient facts to show that the injury they have

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
2016)).
130.
131.

Id. (citing Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1939 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring)).
See id.
Id. (citing Gill, 138 S.Ct. at 1938 (Kagan, J., concurring)).
Id. (citing Gill, 138 S.Ct. at 1939 (Kagan, J., concurring)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 996, 998 (citing Shapiro v. McManus, 203 F. Supp. 3d 595, 595-98 (D. Md.
Id. at 997 (citing Shapiro, 203 F. Supp. 3d at 597).
Id.
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suffered is legitimately caused by the challenged conduct of the defendant.132 The plaintiffs met the standing causation requirement by
alleging that the state created the map with an express intent of burdening a minority political party, and that the map assisted in realizing
this impermissible goal.133 The plaintiffs satisfy the standing redressability mandate by showing that a favorable decision would redress their
claimed First Amendment injury.134 Their injury could be redressed
since they are requesting an injunction that stops Ohio from creating
congressional maps with the intent of burdening a group’s representational rights because of “their political beliefs, political party membership, registration, affiliations or political activities, or voting histories.”135
I support the view that the standing analysis is relevant to a political
question under a non-justiciability analysis when a federal court decides that even if the plaintiff has suffered an injury, the injury is not
capable of a judicial resolution because of a lack of discernable manageable judicial standards. The lower federal court federal cases in
both Ohio and Maryland simply use the standing analysis with an emphasis on injury to demonstrate that are not truly non-justiciable political questions because they are capable of judicial resolution.

sfK == qeb= ` lroq Û p= o r`el=sK = ` ljjlk= ` ^rpb= e liafkd=
q e^q= m ^oqfp^k= d boovj^kabofkd= ` i^fjp=^ob= m lifqf`^i=
n rbpqflkp=klq= ` ^m^_ib=lc= cbabo^i= g raf`f^i=
o bplirqflk=fp= r kjfpq^h^_iv= c i^tba =

A. Facts of Rucho v. Common Cause before the Supreme
Court
Plaintiffs in North Carolina and Maryland challenged congressional districting plans in their states alleging the reapportionment
plans violated the constitution because they were designed to promote
extremely partisan interest in reapportionment.136 This section focuses

132.
(2000)).
133.
134.
135.
136.

98

Id. (citing Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 U.S. 167, 180
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180)
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2491 (2019).
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on their First Amendment allegations. The federal district courts in
both states ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and the defendants appealed
directly to the Supreme Court.137 While considering these cases, the
Court once again abandoned its duty to hold that claims of excessive
partisanship in districting are “justiciable” and properly suited for resolution by the federal courts.138 The Supreme Court did not invalidate
a districting plan as creating an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander139 because the Court inexplicably fails to understand the available
judicially manageable standards for deciding such claims easily identified by the lower courts.140 If the lower courts have been able to identify manageable judicial standards, why can’t the Supreme Court? One
plausible explanation may be that some of the justices on the Court
may implicitly want to preserve a Republican gerrymandering advantage.141 Of course, it could be merely coincidental that all of the
justices voting to treat partisan gerrymandering as a political question
were from the political party with a current demonstrated partisan gerrymandering advantage. Unlike the Supreme Court, the courts below
appropriately exercised judicial power when they found that the highly
partisan districting plans were unconstitutional.142
The partisan gerrymandering case, Rucho v. Common Cause, involves a challenge to a Republican-sponsored congressional redistricting plan in North Carolina.143 The second partisan congressional gerrymandering case before the Court, Lamone v. Benisek, involved a
Democrat-sponsored plan in the state of Maryland.144 The plaintiffs
alleged the districting scheme was prohibited by the First Amendment.145 The federal district court considered the plaintiffs’ allegations

137. Id.
138. Contra id.
139. Id.
140. Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst., 335 F.Supp.3d at 998 (citing Shapiro v. McManus,
203 F. Supp.3d 595–98 (D. Md. 2019)).
141. See Associated Press, supra note 9.
142. See Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst., 335 F.Supp.3d at 998 (citing Shapiro, 203 F. Supp.
3d at 595–98).
143. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2491.
144. Id. at 2493.
145. Id.
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and decided that the Maryland plan infringed upon the plaintiffs’ freedom of association.146 An appeal was filed with the Supreme Court by
way of 28 United States Code Section 1253.147

B. Analysis of Rucho v. Common Cause before the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court refused to hold extreme partisan gerrymandering was unconstitutional.148 The Court’s 5-4 judgment in Rucho v.
Common Cause, that partisan gerrymandering of federal legislative
districts was not capable of judicial resolution by the federal courts because of the lack of discernable manageable judicial standards, was rendered without any legitimate constitutional justification, according to
a stinging dissent by Justice Elena Kagan.149 Chief Justice John Roberts, author of the majority opinion, said that what the allegedly injured plaintiffs were requesting was an exceptional extension of judicial
power.150 According to Chief Justice Roberts, the dissent want an unprecedented increase in judicial influence in partisan gerrymandering.151 The Supreme Court has consistently refused to invalidate a partisan gerrymander as prohibited by the constitution—and the Court
has rejected the many prior invitations it has received over the last 45
years to prohibit partisan gerrymandering.152 This requested increase
of judicial influence involving partisan gerrymandering would involve
judging extremely partisan American political life as it is linked to reapportionment.153 Chief Justice Roberts believes the Supreme Court
should reject the opportunity to resolve partisan gerrymandering
claims on the merits because undue judicial influence would inherently
exist if the Supreme Court involves itself in resolving partisan gerrymandering issues.154 According to Chief Justice Roberts, once the Supreme Court started to adjudicate partisan gerrymandering cases, its
146. Id. (quoting Benisek v. Lamone, 348 F. Supp. 3d 493, 498 (D. Md. 2018), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019)).
147. Id.
148. Galen Druke, Partisan Gerrymandering Isn't The Supreme Court's Problem Anymore, FIVE THIRTY EIGHT (June 27, 2019, 1:34 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/partisan-gerrymandering-isnt-the-supreme-courts-problem-anymore/.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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authority would be unrestrained in range and time.155 If federal judges
heard partisan gerrymandering cases on the merits, the undue judicial
influence problem would continue to repeat itself nationally “with each
new round of districting, for state as well as federal representatives.
Consideration of the impact of today's ruling on democratic principles
cannot ignore the effect of the unelected and politically unaccountable
branch of the Federal Government assuming such an extraordinary
and unprecedented role.”156 In her dissent, Justice Kagan reminded
Chief Justice Roberts that the Court had abandoned its affirmative
duty to resolve the constitutional violations created by partisan gerrymandering.157 Justice Kagan’s dissent was appropriately critical of
Chief Justice Roberts’ claim that the dissent was seeking to expand judicial power, because the dissent proposed a well-reasoned traditional
constitutional law analysis to allow the Supreme Court to exercise its
judicial power to resolve a partisan gerrymandering problem that
should be prohibited by the constitution.158 According to Justice Kagan, “For the first time ever, this Court refuses to remedy a constitutional violation because it thinks the task beyond judicial capabilities.”159 Justice Kagan reasoned that placing restrictions on
gerrymandered districts is unequivocally within the scope of the Supreme Court.160 Justice Kagan said, “The partisan gerrymanders here
debased and dishonored our democracy, turning upside-down the core
American idea that all governmental power derives from the people.”161 In the past, prior to retiring in 2018, Justice Anthony Kennedy
took the position “that partisan gerrymandering was within the purview of the court but that the justices should hold off on ruling any
particular gerrymander unconstitutional until a manageable standard
for measuring gerrymandering emerged.”162 By ruling that partisan
gerrymandering is not an issue for the federal courts to resolve, the
Supreme Court failed to do its job of protecting American democracy
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Galen Druke, Partisan Gerrymandering Isn't The Supreme Court's Problem Anymore, FIVE THIRTY EIGHT (June 27, 2019, 1:34 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/partisan-gerrymandering-isnt-the-supreme-courts-problem-anymore/
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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by rejecting the excellent road map for resolving partisan gerrymandering issues handed to it by the lower court in Rucho v. Common
Cause.163 A majority of Americans who may take issue with extreme
partisan gerrymandering164 may now also question whether the Supreme Court was acting in an impartial manner to protect the rights
of voters. Americans may question whether the Court operates free of
partisan politics, because each justice voted on the partisan gerrymandering issue in a manner that may have suggested to a casual observer
that the justice was either a so-called Republican justice or a so-called
Democrat justice rather than an independent justice of the Court serving free of political pressure or prestige.
Representative Hakeem Jeffries, who leads the House Democratic
Caucus, recently suggested on CNN’s “New Day” that the role of Supreme Court justices and the court-packing question should be an issue given focused consideration for the November 2020 federal elections.165 The court-packing concept is questionable as a historical and
practical matter, but it resurfaced in 2019.166 A court-packing strategy
was perhaps inspired by the 2016 denial of President Barrack Obama’s
nominee Merrick Garland a confirmation hearing before the Senate.167
Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell said that although the
Obama nominee to the Supreme Court was not given an opportunity
to fill a vacant seat, under similar circumstances he would encourage
the Senate to accept and give its consent to confirm a Trump-sponsored Supreme Court candidate.168 “McConnell’s comments were an
audacious reversal of his 2016 election-year position blocking Garland
for the vacancy caused by the sudden death that February of Justice
Antonin Scalia. McConnell argued that the seat should be filled by
whoever won the then-upcoming presidential election.”169 One leading candidate for the Democratic Presidential nomination, Senator
Bernie Sanders of Vermont, does not endorse the Supreme-Court-

163. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2492-93 (2019).
164. Druke, supra note 157.
165. Joan Biskupic, Democrats Look At Packing The Supreme Court To Pack The Vote,
CNN POLITICS (last updated May 21, 2019 6:04 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/31/politics/ democrats-supreme-court-packing-politics/index.html.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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packing schemes.170 Senator Sanders disapproves of “court packing”
because he appropriately believes it is likely to benefit Republicans.171
Sanders proposed term limits for Supreme Court justices.
Separate and distinct from the Court packing issue both parties
have engaged in activities that have placed the Supreme Court and the
entire judiciary in the center of current politics.172 In July of 2019,
President Trump tweeted that “the country needs ‘more Republicans . . . And must ALWAYS hold the Supreme Court.’” Also during
this month, he “disparaged a judge based on his appointment by the
Democrat Obama.”173 While commenting on a ruling that an accounting firm was required to deliver Trump’s financial records, the President characterized the decision as an improper decision rendered by
an Obama-appointed judge.174 Trump’s and Senator McConnell’s partisan comments regarding the federal judiciary undermine the optic of
federal judicial independence.175 New York University Law Professor
Barry Friedman contends that a politicized judiciary is totally at war
with the goal of independent judicial review.176 Chief Justice John Roberts has attempted to discourage public officials from referring to federal judges as either an Obama Judge or a Trump judge. 177 Chief Justice Roberts advanced the view that America has a remarkable
collection of dedicated judges committed to treating equally those
coming into their courts.178
The Court’s Rucho v. Common Cause opinion may very well incite politicization claims.179 In Rucho v. Common Cause,180 the issue
of judicial politicization instinctively appears in the mind of a reasonable observer when a group of five Supreme Court justices appointed
by presidents identified with the Republican Party vote to support a
political question theory that has the practical effect of leaving in place
an established partisan gerrymandering advantage for the Republican
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
Id.
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Party.181 The Supreme Court ruled that partisan gerrymandering
claims were not justiciable without a well-reasoned justification.182
While reviewing Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion183 that partisan
gerrymandering is justiciable, it occurred to me that it is very likely
that a politicized justice on the Court would apply the political question doctrine to partisan gerrymandering in an effort to preserve a Republican partisan gerrymandering advantage.184 It is plausible to argue
there are five politicized Republican appointed Justices on the Roberts
Court because after conceding that excessive partisan gerrymandering
produces outcomes incompatible with democratic principles, the Supreme Court denies plaintiffs a federal judicial remedy.185 I reject the
Court’s assertion that the federal judiciary does not know how to develop manageable standards to protect core democratic principles, because the lower federal courts have demonstrated how to utilize judicial standards to resolve partisan gerrymandering issues.186 It is my
position that an implicitly politicized majority of justices on the Court
decided that partisan gerrymandering claims present political questions beyond the scope of the federal courts because of the demonstrated partisan gerrymandering advantage currently held by the Republicans.187 “Supreme Court justices insist that politics plays no role
in their decision-making. But their voting patterns and the titanic partisan confirmation battles for seats on the court tell a different
story.”188 The belief that politics play no role in the decision-making
process was made “before the start of a successful 10-month Republican blockade of President Barack Obama's nomination of Judge Merrick B. Garland. The senators who refused to give Judge Garland a
hearing appeared to disagree with the chief justice’s assessment.”189 According to Adam Liptak,190 who reports on the United States Supreme
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 9.
See generally Rucho, 139 S. Ct. 2484.
Id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 9.
Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2507.
Contra, id.

See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 9.
Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Says Judges Are Above Politics. It May Hear a Case
Testing That View, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 09/16/us/politics/supreme-court-judges-partisanship.html.
189. Id.
190. Adam Liptak, THE NEW YORK TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/by/adam-liptak, (last visited Dec. 8, 2019) (“Adam Liptak covers the United States Supreme Court and writes
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Court and authors Sidebar, a column on legal activities, “Political science data tends to support the politicians rather than the justices when
it comes to whether politics plays a part in judges’ decisions. The
data demonstrates a significant correlation between judges’ political
affiliations and their voting.”191 One very informed commentator, Michael W. McConnell, a former federal appeals court judge and current
law professor at Stanford, believes the goal of judging federal case
without a political component at Supreme Court is only aspirational.192
I advance the argument that the public may perceive that Republican-appointed justices on the Supreme Court refuse to address the
First Amendment freedom of association partisan gerrymandering issues because partisan gerrymandering typically preserves electoral
power for the Republican Party.193 Unlike the indirectly politicized
majority, I believe the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Rucho v. Common Cause condones excessive partisan gerrymandering while sending
complaints about partisan gerrymandering to an inferior state court for
a judicial remedy.194
The introductory paragraph of Justice Kagan's dissent in Rucho v.
Common Cause appropriately captures the unnecessary harm created
by the Supreme Court's blatant refusal to remedy a constitutional violation, and is an adequate response to the flawed and unacceptable justification articulated by the Court for treating all partisan gerrymandering as a political question.195 Unlike Chief Justice Roberts, I believe
when excessive partisanship in districting leads to results that reasonably seem unjust and “incompatible with democratic principles," federal
judges may be required to regulate political power between the two
major political parties based upon reasoned merits found in the Constitution.196 Judicial review of partisan gerrymandering meets those
basic requirements.197

Sidebar, a column on legal developments. A graduate of Yale Law School, he practiced law for
14 years before joining The New York Times's news staff in 2002. He was a finalist for the 2009
Pulitzer Prize in explanatory reporting. He has taught courses on the Supreme Court and the
First Amendment at several law schools, including Yale and the University of Chicago.”).
191. Liptak, supra note 188.
192. Id.
193. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 9.
194. Contra Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019).
195. Id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
196. Contra Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2506-07.
197. Contra id. at 2507
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Chief Justice Robert’s treatment of partisan gerrymandering as a
political question should also be rejected because Justice Kagan
pointed out how partisan gerrymandering may violate people's constitutional rights.198 “That statement is not the lonesome cry of a dissenting Justice. This Court has recognized extreme partisan gerrymandering as such a violation for many years. Partisan gerrymandering
operates through vote dilution—the devaluation of one citizen's vote
as compared to others,”199 said Justice Kagan.
According to Justice Kagan, the majority’s claim that it cannot render a judicial remedy because it thinks the task is beyond judicial capabilities should be rejected.200 Under my analysis, the politicized majority did not want to treat the partisan gerrymandering issue as a
constitutional violation because it did not want to confront the demonstrated partisan gerrymandering advantage for the Republicans. Partisan gerrymandering should not be treated as an ordinary constitutional
disruption, because partisan gerrymanders in the cases before the
Court robbed citizens of their fundamental constitutional right to have
a say equally about political endeavors, to connect with others in order
to broadcast political beliefs, and to choose political representatives.201

sffK == ` lk`irpflk =
Excessive partisan gerrymanders debase and dishonor America’s
democracy by reversing the fundamental American belief that all governmental power originates with the people.202 An insightful Justice
Kagan, while speaking about harm caused by partisan gerrymandering,
said, “These gerrymanders enabled politicians to entrench themselves
in office as against voters’ preferences. They promoted partisanship
above respect for the popular will. They encouraged a politics of polarization and dysfunction. If left unchecked, gerrymanders like the
ones here may irreparably damage our system of government.”203 I
consider a politicized justice on the Supreme Court to be a justice who

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
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Id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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very predictably engages in suspect legal reasoning in an effort to support the position of the political party identified with the president
who nominated him or her for a position on the Court. Scrutinizing a
partisan, politically inspired gerrymander is not beyond the competence of courts with judges or justices who follow the dictates of the
Constitution rather than the recognized goals of partisan politicians
seeking a political advantage at the expense of democracy.204 Justice
Kagan said, “The majority’s abdication comes just when courts across
the country, including those below, have coalesced around manageable
judicial standards to resolve partisan gerrymandering claims.”205
The observed judicial standards utilized by lower courts to conclude that partisan gerrymandering is not a political question actually
meet the standards set by an apparently politicized majority on the
Court.206 Objective judicial standards, when applied by judges who are
not politicized, allow lower federal court judges to protect the freedom
of association of partisan voters.207 Proper judicial standards, when applied by judges who are truly independent of partisan bias, will limit
courts to fixing only egregious gerrymanders and will prevent impartial judges from excessively getting involved in the political process.208
Neutral judicial standards when applied by the lower courts in an impartial manner permit “judicial intervention in the worst-of-the-worst
cases of democratic subversion, causing blatant constitutional harms.
In other words, they allow courts to undo partisan gerrymanders of the
kind we face today from North Carolina and Maryland. In giving such
gerrymanders a pass from judicial review, the majority goes tragically
wrong.”209 After the majority of the justices in Rucho v. Common
Cause identified some risks every impartial judge would like to escape,
the majority simply ignored the fact that for several years now, federal
courts throughout the nation have developed standards for resolving
partisan gerrymandering claims.210 The standard for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims may appear to be virtually impossible for
a politicized justice on the Supreme Court who cannot identify with a
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 2516 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citing Ohio A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Householder, 373 F. Supp. 3d 978 (S.D. Ohio 2010)); League of Women Voters of Michigan v. Benson,
373 F. Supp. 3d 867, 881 (E.D. Mich. 2019).
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concept of electoral fairness that denies the Republican Party its current demonstrated partisan gerrymandering benefit advantage.
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